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1. Introduction
Financial structure and managerial compensation are crucial for gen-
erating value to shareholders because of their influence on manage-
rial quality and incentives. Practitioners have long recognized that
the two are interdependent; for instance, in the leveraged buyout
(LBO) wave of the 1980s, financiers used high levels of debt and
performance-sensitive compensation packages to motivate managers.
Despite this apparent interdependence, economists have by and large
studied financial structure and managerial compensation in isolation.
For example, the principle-agent literature (e.g., Mirrlees, 1976; Harris
and Raviv, 1979; Holmström, 1979) studies the design of managerial
compensation contracts but abstracts from financial structure consid-
erations. Likewise, agency models of capital structure (e.g, Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982) do not consider managerial
compensation explicitly.1
This paper develops a theory of managerial compensation and
capital structure that explicitly allows for their interdependence. To
this end, we consider a three-period model. In period 0, the firm is
established and a manager is hired. In period 1, the manager takes
actions that boost the future cash flow of the firm, but also make
the firm more dependent on his ability. For example, the manager
selects workers, organizes production, chooses the firm’s strategy in
the product market, etc. We model this activity as a choice of an unob-
servable effort level that, together with managerial ability, determines
the cash flow of the firm in period 2. After taking his actions (but
before the cash flow is realized), the manager and the shareholders
receive a common signal that perfectly reveals the period 2 cash flow
under his control. At this point, shareholders may replace the manager
with a new manager whose ability is yet unknown. However, if the
incumbent manager is replaced, the firm loses the extra cash flow that
his actions may have generated; this in turn enables the manager to
demand more compensation. Anticipating this demand, shareholders
select the manager’s compensation contract and the financial structure
of the firm to provide him with appropriate incentives, while limiting
his ability to demand a higher wage. This framework enables us to
address important questions that were not addressed before; for exam-
ple: Do highly levered firms tend to pay their managers higher wages
than firms with low or moderate debt levels? Do they replace their
1 Another branch of the literature considers the role of external forces, such as the
market for corporate control or competition in the product market, in ensuring manage-
rial quality and effort (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980; Hart, 1983; Scharfstein, 1988a, b).
Again, this literature generally ignores the effect of the firm’s financial structure on
managerial incentives and quality.
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managers more often? And do their securities tend to have higher
market values?
The choices of managerial compensation and capital structure
are driven in our model by two effects. First, when the firm is lever-
aged, replacing a manager whose ability is known with a new man-
ager whose ability is yet unknown shifts value from debtholders to
shareholders. Consequently, risky debt credibly commits the share-
holders to an overly aggressive replacement policy, and this may moti-
vate the manager to exert more effort ex ante in order to promote his
chances to keep his job.2 We refer to this effect as the job-security effect.
This effect is positive only if the marginal productivity of the man-
ager is increasing at the critical cash flow below which the manager
is replaced (the replacement rule). Otherwise, raising the replacement
rule has an adverse effect on managerial effort.3 When this is the case,
the firm may restore managerial incentives by offering the manager a
golden parachute that softens the replacement rule by making it more
costly to fire the manager. Second, committing debt payments to out-
siders reduces the free cash flow of the firm and limits the compen-
sation that the manager can demand. We refer to this effect of debt
as the free-cash-flow effect. This effect always discourages managerial
effort, since it implies that the manager captures a smaller fraction
of his marginal contribution to the firm’s cash flow. Moreover, this
effect may decrease managerial quality because it induces the firm to
adopt an ex post inefficient replacement rule. The net impact of the
free-cash-flow effect on the ex ante value of the firm is positive only
if the manager captures a sufficiently large fraction of the free cash
flow and the firm’s performance is not too sensitive to managerial
incentives and quality.4
Our model yields several interesting, and as far as we know,
novel empirical predictions. The first prediction concerns the relation-
ship between severance payments (golden parachutes) and debt:
• Firms that issue risky debt do not offer their managers a golden
parachute.
2 In other words, all else equal, the shareholders of a leveraged firm prefer to take
a gamble and hire a new manager in the hope that the cash flow under him will exceed
that under the incumbent manager (i.e., engage in asset substitution). Anticipating this
incentive, the manager may work harder in order to generate enough cash flow to
make the gamble too costly for shareholders (see Berkovitch and Israel, 1996). Note
however that debtholders are not duped: the shareholders’ behavior is anticipated by
the debtholders and reflected in the pricing of debt when it is issued.
3 This implies that setting a high standard provides incentives only if the standard
is “realistic.” If the standard is already high, raising it further is counterproductive.
4 Although we focus attention on the job-security and free-cash-flow effects, there
are obviously other factors that drive the firm’s internal policy decisions, including the
firm’s investment opportunity set (Smith and Watts, 1992), diversification (Rose and
Shepard, 1997), and regulatory and political constraints (Joskow et al., 1996).
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This prediction may seem counterintuitive at first glance, since golden
parachutes are typically thought of as means of insuring managers
against the risk of losing their jobs; given that risky debt raises this
risk, it might be thought that golden parachutes and risky debt will
be offered simultaneously. However, in our model all agents are risk-
neutral, and more importantly, the firm uses risky debt and golden
parachutes as means to motivate the manager to exert more effort.
When the marginal productivity of the manager is increasing at the
efficient replacement rule, the current replacement rule is too soft,
so the firm motivates the manager by issuing risky debt that makes
the replacement rule more aggressive. When the marginal productiv-
ity of the manager is decreasing at the efficient replacement rule, the
replacement rule is already too aggressive. Therefore the firm offers
the manager a golden parachute that softens the replacement rule and
thereby motivates the manager to work harder.5
A second empirical prediction concerns the impact of manage-
rial replacement on the market values of debt and equity and on the
future cash flow of the firm. Intuitively, when the firm issues risky
debt, the replacement rule becomes overly aggressive in the sense that
the critical level of the period 2 cash flow below which the manager is
replaced exceeds the average cash flow under an alternative manager.
Therefore, on average, firms that retain their managers have a higher
cash flow than firms that replace their managers. Moreover, since the
price of equity and debt in period 0 reflect both low and high real-
izations of the period 2 cash flow, managerial replacement conveys
bad news to the market, whereas managerial retention conveys good
news. This leads to the following predictions:
• The market values of equity and debt fall if the manager is replaced.
Moreover, the expected cash flow of firms that retain their managers
exceeds that of firms that replace their managers.
In Section 4 below, we argue that these predictions are consistent with
empirical evidence.
Another implication of our model is that if the manager is
retained, his wage represents a fraction of his incremental contribu-
tion to earnings over and above the contribution of an alternative manager.
This implies that the manager’s wage could be a small fraction of
the firm’s overall cash flow, even if, on the margin, the manager cap-
tures a large fraction of the cash flow. This may shed light on Jensen
5 It should be emphasized that in practice, firms may have additional reasons for
issuing debt and offering golden parachutes, beyond those that are considered in our
model. In a more general setting, this prediction suggests a negative correlation between
leverage and golden parachutes.
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and Murphy’s (1990) estimate that the pay-performance sensitivity for
CEOs of publicly owned corporations is quite small (about $3.25 per
$1000 change in shareholders wealth). Jensen and Murphy argue that
their estimate is too low to provide CEOs with meaningful incentives.
Our theory suggests that their estimate may be low simply because
it measures the average pay-performance sensitivity, which could be
quite low, even if the marginal pay-performance sensitivity is large
enough to provide CEOs with strong incentives.
A third type of empirical predictions concerns the choice of debt,
the managerial effort, the managerial compensation, the managerial
turnover, the expected cash flow conditional on the manager being
retained, and the value of the firm. Due to the complexity of our
model, we derive these predictions from numerical simulations. Con-
trolling for firm size, these simulations yield, inter alia, the following
predictions:
• Leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that
retain their managers are positively correlated.
• Probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively
correlated.
• Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with
leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows.
Our premise that capital structure is important for disciplining
and monitoring managers has been made earlier by Grossman and
Hart (1982). In their model, the manager’s goals are not fully aligned
with those of shareholders. To overcome this problem, the firm issues
debt, which increases the probability of bankruptcy. Because the man-
ager is effectively assumed to lose his job if the firm goes bankrupt,
debt induces him to come closer to profit maximization. But from
Grossman and Hart it is unclear why the manager should lose his
job, because the agency problem in their paper is one of moral haz-
ard, so ex post, the manager is as good as any other manager that the
firm can hire. Indeed, one contribution of our paper is that it provides
a mechanism through which debt credibly commits the firm to replace
its manager if profits are not sufficiently high.
More recently, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Berkovitch and
Israel (1996) examined the role of capital structure in disciplining man-
agers in settings that are closer to the present one. The focus of these
papers, however, is on the allocation of control rights rather than
the interaction between capital structure and managerial compensa-
tion. Similarly to these papers, Dessi (1997) shows that short-term
debt triggers creditors’ intervention when the firm is underperform-
ing. In addition, she shows that long-term debt induces the manager
to exert effort by curtailing his ability to raise funds in the future.
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Like our paper, Holmström and Tirole (1993) also examine the interac-
tion between capital structure and managerial compensation, but their
focus is on equity financing. They show that by issuing outside equity,
insiders increase the liquidity of the firm’s stock, and thereby encour-
age speculators to monitor managerial performance. This improves
the information content of the stock price and allows the firm to
design a more efficient managerial compensation contract. Garvey
and Swan (1992) also study the interaction between capital structure
and incentive schemes, but in their model the incentive schemes are
offered to a group of workers rather than to the firm’s manager. Their
theory predicts lower debt levels and more compressed pay scales as
cooperation between workers becomes more important.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
present the model, and in Section 3 we solve it and characterize the
equilibrium. In Section 4 we provide empirical predictions regarding
price reactions and changes in the expected cash flow of the firm
following its decision on whether or not to replace its manager. In
Section 5 we solve the model numerically and derive cross-sectional
empirical predictions. We conclude in Section 6. All proofs appear in
the Appendix.
2. The Model
A firm is established in period 0 and operates in periods 1 and 2.
The sequence of events is described in Figure 1. In period 0, after
the firm is established, the shareholders hire a manager to run it, and
issue debt to be repaid at the end of period 2 and possibly additional
equity to outsiders. The proceeds from issuing the new securities are
either invested in the firm or paid out as a dividend. In period 1, the
manager chooses a nonverifiable effort level, e, that affects the cash
flow of the firm in period 2. For example, e can represent a long-term
investment in R&D or in a new line of business that materializes only
in period 2. Apart from effort, the period 2 cash flow of the firm is also
affected by the manager’s ability to run the firm, which, at the time
the manager is hired, is as yet unknown either to the shareholders
or to the manager. To reflect the uncertainty regarding the manager’s
ability, we assume that given an effort level e, the period 2 cash flow
is represented by a random variable y, distributed on + according to
a distribution function H(y | e). We assume that H(y | e) satisfies the
linear distribution function condition (LDFC) (Hart and Holmström,
1987), so H(y | e) = eH1(y)+ (1−e)H2(y), where H1(y) and H2(y) are
twice continuously differentiable distributions, with H1(y) ≤ H2(y)
for all y and a strict inequality for some y. This implies that H1(y)
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FIGURE 1. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
dominates H2(y) in the first-order stochastic dominance sense. Defin-
ing (y) ≡ H2(y) − H1(y) ≥ 0, we can write
H(y | e) = H2(y) − e(y) (1)
The density function of y is h(y | e) = h2(y) − e′(y), where ′(y) ≡
h2(y)−h1(y). Our formulation implies that the manager’s effort deter-
mines a convex combination of two fixed distributions, each of which
captures the manager’s unknown productivity; by exerting more effort,
the manager increases the probability that the cash flow in period 2
will be drawn from the better distribution, H1(y). The parameter (y)
represents the marginal productivity of managerial effort. Following
the neoclassical tradition, we assume that (y) is unimodal, which
implies that the manager’s average “production function” has an
inverted U-shape.6 In addition, we assume that limy→∞ y(y) = 0.
This assumption is satisfied, for example, when the support of y is
finite.
In period 1, after the manager has exerted effort, he and the
shareholders observe a common nonverifiable signal, S, about the
period 2 cash flow under his control. To avoid unnecessary complica-
tions, we assume that S perfectly reveals the period 2 cash flow under
the incumbent manager. Having observed S, shareholders decide
whether to retain the current manager or replace him with an alterna-
tive manager. The latter is drawn from a large pool of potential man-
agers. We assume that the market for managers is competitive and
normalize the reservation utility of managers (including the incum-
bent manager) from alternative jobs to 0.7 In addition, we assume
6 This assumption is weaker than the assumption that the distribution function H
has the monotone likelihood-ratio property, and it is satisfied by most smooth distribu-
tions; for example, the assumption holds when H1 and H2 are two exponential, normal,
lognormal, uniform, or logistic distributions.
7 The assumption that the reservation utility of the incumbent manager from
an alternative job is 0 implies that the signal S reveals information only about the
manager’s productivity in his current job (firm-specific human capital), not about his
productivity in other jobs (general human capital). Moreover, the assumption that the
managerial labor market is competitive means that a new manager has no bargaining
power vis-à-vis the firm.
556 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
that the cash flow under an alternative manager is distributed on +
according to a distribution function H3(y).8 The mean cash flow in
period 2 under an alternative manager is ȳ = ∫∞0 yh3(y) dy. Since
H3(y) is independent of e, it follows that managerial effort is idiosyn-
cratic in the sense that it affects the firm’s cash flow only if the incum-
bent manager is retained.
Having described the information structure, we turn to the wage
contract that the manager gets in period 0. Since the manager’s effort
level and the signal S are nonverifiable to a third party, the wage con-
tract can be conditioned in principle only on the period 2 cash flow,
which is verifiable, and on whether the manager stays with the firm,
quits his job, or is fired (but not on managerial effort and the signal).
In practice, however, it is often difficult to determine unambiguously
whether a manager left a firm voluntarily or was forced to resign (i.e.,
was fired).9 To reflect this difficulty, we assume that the events that led
to the manager’s departure are not verifiable. This means that a wage
contract is a pair (w0 w1), where w0 is the manager’s compensation if
he either quits his job or is being fired, and w1 is his compensation if
he stays with the firm.10 Since the period 2 cash flow is independent
of the incumbent manager’s effort once he leaves the firm, the way
in which w0 is paid (equity, options, bonds, cash, etc.) is immaterial.11
For convenience, we shall assume that w0 is paid in the form of a
senior bond and refer to it as a golden parachute.
8 Although we do not put restrictions on H3(y), it is natural to assume that H3(y) =
H2(y), since this implies that ex ante all managers are the same. The incumbent manager
then has an advantage in that only he can exert effort in period 1 and affect the period 2
cash flow. We do not require that H3(y) = H2(y), in order to emphasize that our results
hold for any distribution function H3(y) provided that its support is +.
9 See for instance, Weisbach (1988) or Denis et al. (1997). A similar situation arises
in professional sports, where often there are controversies regarding the events that led
to the departure of a head coach (who is an a sense like a CEO of a company) from
his position. For example, when Bora Miltanovich left his position as the head coach
of the US soccer team, he claimed to have been fired, while the US olympic committee
claimed that he quit at his will. Similarly, when Pat Riley left the New York Knicks in
1995, there was a controversy regarding the events that led to his departure.
10 Agrawal and Knoeber (1998) examine a sample of 446 firms that appeared on the
Forbes magazine list of the 500 largest US firms in (1987) (excluding public utilities)
and find that 51% of the CEOs in the sample had golden parachutes (provisions for
certain cash and other benefits if the CEO is fired, is demoted, or resigns within a
certain time period). They also find that only 12% of the CEOs had a written assurance
of job security and/or income protection for a specified number of years, and only
2% had both written assurances and golden parachutes. The small incidence of written
assurances of job security is consistent with our assumption that it may be very hard
to specify unambiguously the events that lead to a change in control.
11 In other words, once the manager leaves the firm, the ability of the firm to pay w0
depends only on the cash flow under the alternative manager, which is independent of
the incumbent manager’s effort. Therefore, only the expected value of w0 is important
for our analysis.
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Unlike w0, the manager’s wage when he stays with the firm, w1,
depends on the period 2 cash flow, which in turn depends on the man-
ager’s effort level. Our model differs from standard principal-agent
models in that here the employment relationship can be terminated
at any time, with the court being unable to determine unambiguously
which party is responsible for this termination. Therefore if the man-
ager believes that he can extract from the firm more than w1, he can
threaten to quit unless w1 is renegotiated. Likewise, if the sharehold-
ers believe that it is possible to cut w1, they can threaten to fire the
manager unless w1 is renegotiated. The ability of both parties to force
a wage renegotiation in period 1 once they observe S implies that the
period 0 wage contract is meaningful only if it prescribes the expected
outcome that would be attained under wage renegotiation.12 We post-
pone the description of the renegotiation process until the next sec-
tion, but note that it yields an expected wage that depends on the
period 2 cash flow, w∗1(y). Since the shareholders fully anticipate the
wage renegotiation process, they will offer the manager in period 0 a
renegotiation-proof contract, (w0 w∗1(y)).
Apart from a monetary compensation, whoever runs the firm in
period 2 (either the incumbent or a new manager) draws nontrans-
ferable benefits of control, B. We assume that B is sufficiently large to
ensure that both the incumbent and an alternative manager will agree
to work for the firm in period 2 even without monetary compensa-
tion. The incumbent manager’s cost of effort, ψ(e), is an increasing
and convex function, with ψ′(0) = 0. In addition we assume that all
agents are risk-neutral and we normalize the intertemporal discount
rate to zero.
At the end of period 2, after the cash flow has been realized, the
firm needs to repay its debt and compensate the manager according
to his wage contract. If the cash flow falls short of the financial obli-
gations of the firm, the firm declares bankruptcy and its cash flow is
distributed to debtholders and the manager according to their respec-
tive claims. The shareholder’s payoff in this case is zero.
3. Equilibrium Characterization
We solve the model by backward induction. First, conditional on the
incumbent manager being retained and given the signal S, we solve
for the wage that the manager can obtain by insisting that his wage
12 Alternatively, the parties can specify in the contract an arbitrary w1 with the
understanding that it will be renegotiated in period 1. However, in our model this
possibility gives the parties no advantage, and to the extent that renegotiation is costly,
the parties are better off writing an initial contract that is immune to renegotiation. For
models in which the parties write an ex ante contract with the intention of renegotiating
it later once they have more information, see Chung (1991), Aghion et al. (1994), and
Matthews (1995).
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contract be renegotiated. This allows us to determine w∗1(y), which is
the compensation that a renegotiation-proof wage contract must spec-
ify if the manager stays with the firm. Given the capital structure of
the firm and the wage contract, we solve for the optimal replacement
rule and show that it can be summarized by a critical signal Ŝ∗ such
that the manager is replaced whenever S is below Ŝ∗, and is retained
otherwise. Then, given Ŝ∗ and the wage contract, we solve for the
manager’s effort level. Finally, we solve for the optimal capital struc-
ture of the firm and the severance payment w∗0 that will be specified
in the wage contract.
3.1 The Replacement Rule and Managerial
Compensation
Since the period 0 wage contract is renegotiation-proof, it must guar-
antee the manager the same expected wage that he would obtain
through wage renegotiation. We therefore begin the analysis by con-
sidering the bargaining game that will take place in period 1 if either
party wish to renegotiate the original contract. At the start of this
game, nature selects either the manager (with probability γ) or the
shareholders (with probability 1−γ) to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
If the offer is rejected, the manager leaves the firm and a new manager
is hired. If the offer is accepted, the manager retains his job and gets
the proposed wage. To simplify matters, we assume that the manager
has no private funds, so wage offers must be nonnegative.13
Let F be the face value of the debt that the firm issues in period 0.
Given F and w0, the expected payoff of shareholders if the incumbent




(y − w0 − F)h3(y) dy (2)
This expression represents the expected cash flow of the firm in period
2 under an alternative manager, net of w0 and F , conditional on the
firm being solvent. Recalling that the manager receives w0 before debt








Using equations (2) and (3), we prove the following lemma.
13 Alternatively, it can be assumed, as in Hart (1983), that the manager’s utility from
monetary compensation is given by U(w) = w for w ≥ 0 and U(w) = −∞ otherwise.
Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure 559
Lemma 1: (i) In equilibrium, w0 is set such that Ur < B





 Ŝ ≡ V r + F (4)
Part (i) of the lemma implies that the manager is always better
off staying with the firm, as his benefits of control exceed his expected
severance payment. To interpret w∗1(y), note that y−Ŝ is the difference
between the net cash flow under the current manager, y − F , and
the net expected cash flow under an alternative manager, V r . Hence,
y − Ŝ represents the incumbent manager’s incremental contribution to
the net cash flow over and above the contribution of an alternative
manager. Equation (4) indicates that the manager’s wage when he
keeps his job is a fraction γ of his incremental contribution to the net
cash flow. Therefore, the parameter γ can be thought of as a measure
of the manager’s “bargaining power.”
Next we consider the replacement policy. Sequential rationality
requires shareholders to replace the manager if and only if doing so
enhances the expected value of equity. If the manager is replaced, the
expected value of equity is V r . Since the value of equity if the manager
is retained is y −F −w∗1(y) = y −F −γ
(
y − Ŝ ), shareholders retain the
manager if and only if y − F − γ(y − Ŝ ) > V r , or equivalently, y > Ŝ
Hence,
Lemma 2: In equilibrium, shareholders retain the manager if and only if
y > Ŝ
Lemma 2 defines Ŝ as the critical value of the signal below which
the incumbent manager is replaced; in what follows we shall refer to
Ŝ as the replacement rule. Since Ŝ plays a crucial role in the analysis,
we now study its properties. Using equation (2) and recalling that ȳ =∫∞
0 yh3(y) dy is the mean cash flow in period 2 under an alternative
manager, the replacement rule can be written as
Ŝ ≡ V r + F = ȳ − w0 +
∫ w0+F
0
(w0 + F − y)h3(y) dy (5)
Ex post efficiency requires the manager to be replaced if and only if the
cash flow under him is below ȳ That is, the ex post efficient replace-
ment rule is Ŝ = ȳ Equation (5) however shows that in general the
replacement rule will be ex post inefficient. As a result, the incumbent
manager may sometimes be replaced even if the cash flow under him
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exceeds ȳ, or conversely, be retained even if the cash flow under him
is below ȳ Differentiating Ŝ with respect to F and w0 reveals that
∂Ŝ
∂F
= H3(F + w0) > 0
∂Ŝ
∂w0
= −[1− H3(F + w0)] < 0 (6)
The reason why Ŝ decreases with increasing w0 is straightforward:
the higher w0 is, the more costly it is to fire the manager. Hence,
shareholders adopt a “softer” replacement rule. The reason why the
replacement rule increases with F is more subtle and is due to the
asset substitution effect (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When the firm
is leveraged, replacing a manager whose ability is known with a
manager whose ability is yet unknown shifts value from debtholders
to shareholders. Consequently, as the firm becomes more leveraged,
shareholders become more aggressive and replace the manager more
often.14 As we show below, issuing debt in order to commit to an
ex post inefficient replacement rule may give shareholders a strategic
advantage vis-à-vis the manager.15
3.2 Managerial Effort
Anticipating the replacement rule and given his wage contract, the
manager chooses an effort level at the beginning of period 1 with
the objective of maximizing his expected payoff. Since the manager’s
payoff is B + w∗1(y) when he is retained and Ur when he is replaced,
and since replacement occurs whenever y > Ŝ, the expected payoff of




Urh(y | e) dy +
∫ ∞
Ŝ
[B − w∗1(y)]h(y | e) dy − ψ(e) (7)
where h(y | e) = h2(y) − e′(y) Let e∗ be the effort level that max-
imizes this expression. Differentiating U(e), substituting for w∗1(y)
14 Put differently, the more leveraged the firm becomes, the higher is the probability
of default. Since shareholders receive a zero payoff in the event of default, they have
an incentive to take a gamble in period 1 by hiring a new manager in the hope that his
ability will be higher than the ability of the incumbent manager, so that the firm’s cash
flow will exceed S.
15 The idea that debt may confer a strategic advantage on the firm by commit-
ting it to an ex post inefficient decision has been also used by, e.g., Berkovitch and
Israel (1996) in the context of internal control, Israel (1991) in the context of takeovers,
Spiegel (1996) in the context of procurement contracts, Bronars and Deere (1991) and
Sarig (1998) in the context of bargaining with a labor union, and Novaes and Zingales
(1998) in the context of corporate bureaucracy. In John and John (1993), a leveraged
firm uses managerial compensation as a way to commit to minimize the agency cost
of debt.
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from equation (4), integrating by parts, and using the assumption that
limy→∞ y (y) = 0, the first-order condition for e∗ is
Ur(e∗) = (B − Ur)(Ŝ) + γ
∫ ∞
Ŝ
(y) dy − ψ′(e∗) = 0 (8)
The assumptions that ψ′′ > 0 and ψ′(0) = 0 ensures that e∗ is positive
and unique. To interpret equation (8), note that B − Ur represents the
effective benefits of control that the manager gets when he is retained.
Hence, the first term in the equation captures the positive effect of
effort on the probability that the incumbent manager will be retained
and realize his benefits of control. The second term captures the posi-
tive effect of effort on the expected wage of the manager, conditional
on his being retained. Combined, the first two terms represent the
marginal benefit of effort, and at the optimum, they must be equal to
the marginal cost of effort, ψ′(e∗)
Recalling that Ur is a function of w0 and Ŝ is a function of F
and w0, equation (8) defines the optimal effort level e∗ as an implicit
function of F and w0. To study how these variables affect e∗, we first
differentiate equation (8) with respect to F and e use equation (6), and










(B − Ur)′(Ŝ) − γ(Ŝ)
ψ′′(e∗)
]
H3(w0 + F) (9)
Equation (9) shows that debt has two distinct effects on e∗. The first
is a job-security effect, captured by the first term inside the square
brackets. To see how it works, note that an increase in F increases
the critical signal below which the manager is replaced and loses
his effective benefits, B − Ur . This may induce the manager to exert
either more or less effort, depending on the sign of ′(Ŝ), which deter-
mines whether the marginal productivity of managerial effort, (Ŝ),
increases or decreases in Ŝ. To illustrate, consider Figure 2, which
shows the first-order condition for the manager’s problem assuming
that γ = 0 (i.e., only the job-security effect matters). If the replace-
ment rule is initially at a point like Ŝ1 where ′(Ŝ1) > 0, and the firm
raises it slightly by issuing debt, then the managerial benefit of effort
increases. As a result, the horizontal line in Figure 2(A) shifts upward
and the manager exerts more effort. In contrast, if the replacement
rule is initially at a point like Ŝ2 where ′(Ŝ1) < 0, then raising it
slightly by issuing debt leads to a downward shift in the horizontal
line in Figure 2(A), so the manager exerts less effort.
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FIGURE 2. (A) THE OPTIMAL CHOICE OF MANAGERIAL EFFORT;
(B) THE MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY OF THE MANAGER
The second effect of debt on managerial effort, captured by the
second term inside the square brackets in equation (9), is a free-cash-
flow effect. It arises because w∗1(y) is lower when the firm has less free
cash flow (i.e., cash flow that was not committed to debtholders). This
effect always discourages managerial effort, because an increase in F
lowers the free cash flow of the firm, and hence the manager can
capture a small fraction of his contribution to earnings.
To study the effect of w0 on managerial effort, we differentiate














= −[(B − U
r)′(Ŝ) − γ(Ŝ)][1− H3(w0 + F)]− (Ŝ)[1− H3(w0)]
ψ′′(e∗)
 (10)
Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure 563
The job-security and free-cash-flow effects are also present in
equation (10), although now they have the opposite signs to those
in equation (9), because w0 lowers Ŝ rather than increases it like F .
In addition, w0 has a negative effect on managerial effort, because an
increase in effort means that the manager is less likely to be replaced
and receive the expected payoff Ur . Using equations (9) and (10), we
establish the following result.
Proposition 1: The manager’s effort level, e∗, is increasing in F if and
only if the job-security effect is positive and large enough to outweigh the
(negative) free-cash-flow effect, i.e., (B − Ur)′(Ŝ) > γ(Ŝ). When this
condition holds, e∗ is decreasing in w0.
Proposition 1 implies that a necessary condition for debt to induce
managerial effort is that the marginal productivity of the manager
increases with Ŝ. Moreover, the proposition shows that when debt
boosts managerial effort, the golden parachute w0 lowers it.
3.3 The Choice of Debt and the Golden Parachute
Next, we consider the shareholders’ problem in period 0. Assuming
that the capital market is perfectly competitive, new investors must
break even in expectation, so the entire expected cash flow of the firm,
net of managerial compensation, accrues to the existing shareholders.
Therefore, the expected payoff of the shareholders at the beginning of










h(y | e∗) dy (11)
The first term in this expression corresponds to states of nature in
which the manager is replaced. Then the mean cash flow is ȳ, and
shareholders receive all of it net of the severance payment to the
incumbent manager, either directly or through the pricing of debt.
The second term corresponds to states of nature in which the incum-
bent manager is retained, in which case the period 2 net cash flow is
y − w∗1(y).
The shareholders’ problem is to choose the golden parachute
w0, the face value of debt F , and possibly the amount of equity to be
issued to outsiders, with the objective of maximizing V . Equation (11)
shows that F affects V only through its effect on the replacement
rule Ŝ. The golden parachute w0 affects V through Ŝ, but in addi-
tion it also has a direct effect on V through Ur and an indirect effect
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through e∗. Using the first-order conditions for the shareholders’ prob-
lem, we prove the following result:
Proposition 2: F∗ > 0 implies w∗0 = 0. Hence, a necessary condition for
the firm to offer the incumbent manager a golden parachute is that F∗ = 0.
Taken literally, Proposition 2 says that leveraged firms should
not offer their managers golden parachutes. The reason is that both
debt and golden parachutes are used to influence the replacement
rule that the firm adopts. Since the two instruments have the opposite
effect on the replacement rule, the firm would never use both of them
simultaneously. In practice, however, debt and golden parachutes may
coexist because firms are likely to use them for reasons that are not
taken into account in our model. Therefore, Proposition 2 suggests
that in a more general setting, we should expect to find a negative
correlation between leverage and golden parachutes.
Using equation (5), Proposition (2) implies that if F∗ > 0, then
Ŝ∗ > ȳ, implying that the replacement rule is more “aggressive” than
the ex post efficient rule. On the other hand, if F∗ = 0 and w∗0 > 0, then
Ŝ∗ < ȳ, so the replacement rule is “softer” than the ex post efficient
rule, and if F∗ = w∗0 = 0, then Ŝ∗ = ȳ, so the replacement rule is ex post
efficient. Hence, leveraged firms may replace their manager even if
his productivity is above the average productivity of an alternative
manager, whereas firms who offer their manager a golden parachute
may retain the manager even if his productivity is below that of an
alternative manager.
Equation (11), indicates that the value of the firm depends on F
and w0 in a rather complex manner. To facilitate the analysis, we break
down the overall effect of F and w0 on V into a job-security effect and
a free-cash-flow effect. To disentangle these effects, we consider first
the case where γ = 0, so the free-cash-flow effect disappears.
Proposition 3: Suppose that γ = 0. Then:
(i) If ′(ȳ) > 0, then ȳ < Ŝ∗ < ∞ 0 < F∗ < ∞, and w∗0 = 0, so the firm
issues debt but does not offer the manager a golden parachute.
(ii) If ′(ȳ) ≤ 0, then F∗ = 0. Now the firm may set w∗0 > 0 provided that
B is sufficiently large.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. When γ = 0, the
firm issues debt only if this induces the manager to exert more effort.
This scheme works because it commits shareholders to an overly
aggressive replacement rule such that Ŝ∗ > ȳ. When the marginal
productivity of the manager is increasing at the efficient replacement
rule, i.e., ′(ȳ) > 0, raising the replacement rule above ȳ motivates the
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manager to work harder.16 Hence, shareholders choose F∗ by trading
off the benefit from boosting e∗ against the loss from distorting the
replacement rule. In contrast, when ′(ȳ) ≤ 0, shareholders do not
benefit from issuing debt, because it discourages managerial effort;
consequently F∗ = 0. Now, shareholders may offer the manager a
golden parachute in order to make it even less attractive to replace
him later on. If B is sufficiently large, the extra protection against
dismissal induces the manager to exert more effort, so offering him
a golden parachute may be optimal for shareholders if the result-
ing increase of cash flow outweighs the cost of offering a golden
parachute.
Next we isolate the free-cash-flow effect in order to study its
effect on the capital structure of the firm. To this end we assume that
H1 = H2, in which case (y) = 0 for all y, so the cash flow in period 2
is affected only by the manager’s ability and not by his effort. This
assumption eliminates the job-security effect, because the manager has
no way to promote his chances to retain his job, implying that e∗ = 0.
Hence, the firm chooses F∗ by trading off the benefit from limiting
the manager’s compensation against the loss from adopting an ex post
inefficient replacement rule.17
Proposition 4: Suppose that H1 = H2, so that (y) = 0 for all y. Then
for all γ > 0, one has Ŝ > ȳ, F∗ > 0, and w∗0 = 0. Moreover, F∗ increases
with γ.
Proposition 4 is in the spirit of Jensen’s (1986) free-cash-flow
hypothesis: the firm issues debt in order to restrict the cash flow that
can accrue to the manager. However, unlike in Jensen, here the benefit
from issuing debt must be traded off against the distortion of the
replacement rule.
4. Price Reactions and Expected Cash Flow
In this section we examine the implications of our theory for the
impact of managerial replacement on the prices of the firm’s secu-
rities and on its future cash flow.
16 For instance, ′(ȳ) > 0 whenever H1 and H2 are two exponential, normal, or
logistic distributions. In contrast, when H1 and H2 are two lognormal, uniform, or
gamma distributions, ′(ȳ) may be either positive or negative, depending on the spe-
cific parameters of the distributions; for example, when the two distributions are log-
normal, with parameters (1+ t 2) and (1 2), respectively, ′(ȳ) > 0 if and only if t < 4
[with ′(ȳ) > 0 when t = 4].
17 Another way to eliminate the job-security effect is to assume that B = 0. Then,
provided that ′(e)/′′(e) is increasing in e (i.e., the cost of effort is sufficiently convex),
we get the same result as in Proposition 4.
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Proposition 5: (i) The market values of equity and debt and the value of
the firm decrease if the manager is replaced and increase if the manager
is retained.
(ii) The expected cash flow of leveraged firms that retain their manager
exceeds that of firms that replace their manager.
Proposition 5 has several empirical implications. First, since the
prices of equity and debt in period 0 reflect both low realizations of
S for which the manager is replaced and high realizations for which
the manager is retained, managerial replacement should convey bad
news to the capital market and be associated with negative price reac-
tions. This prediction is consistent with Khanna and Poulsen (1995),
who find that changes in top management lead to a negative price
reaction, especially in firms that end up filing for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11.18
Second, to the extent that earnings are serially correlated, cur-
rent earnings can serve as a proxy for the signal S. Since managerial
replacement is associated with low realizations of S, Proposition 5
implies that lower current earnings are associated with a higher prob-
ability of managerial replacement. This result is consistent with the
finding of Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Warner et al. (1988),
Weisbach (1988), Kaplan and Minton (1994), and Blackwell et al. (1994).
Third, since the manager is replaced whenever S < Ŝ∗, and since
Ŝ∗ exceeds the average cash flow under an alternative manager, ȳ,
whenever F∗ > 0, it follows that all else equal, firms that retain
their managers have on average a higher cash flow than firms that
replace their managers. This prediction is consistent with Murphy
and Zimmerman (1993), who find that the market-adjusted growth
rates of sales decline significantly prior to CEO departures and remain
negative for several years following the departure. The prediction is
also consistent with Kang and Shivdasani (1997), who find in a sam-
ple of nonfinancial Japanese firms that the industry-adjusted return
on assets (ratio of pretax operating income to total assets) was neg-
ative in the three years prior to a nonroutine managerial turnover
18 In contrast with Khanna and Poulsen, Warner et al. (1988) do not find significant
stock price reactions to announcements on managerial turnover. Their finding however
may be due to the fact that the announcements were anticipated by the market from
the poor performance of the firms prior to the announcement. For example, Denis and
Denis (1995) find a significant negative cumulative abnormal return over the 250 days
preceding the turnover announcement (−1714% in the case of forced resignations of top
management in large corporations), but not in the two days prior to the announcement
itself. Similarly, Furtado and Rozeff (1987) find a 3.7% average two-day-announcement-
period abnormal return for forced dismissals but argue that “The evidence appears to
be consistent with a market that is already aware of negative performance associated
with management and regards the dismissal as good news and a sign that the problem
may be remedied” (pp. 155–156). For additional evidence on the stock price reactions
to announcements of managerial turnover, see the survey of Furtado and Karan (1990).
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(the company’s president did not remain on the board of directors).
It should be pointed out though that this prediction is cross-sectional
and compares firms that replace their managers with firms that do
not. In particular, the prediction does not rule out the possibility that
the performance of a given firm may improve after its manager is
replaced because the expected cash flow prior to the replacement,∫ Ŝ∗
0 yh(y | e∗)dy, might well fall short of ȳ, which is the expected cash
flow under a new manager (this is especially true if Ŝ∗ is not too much
above ȳ).19
5. Comparative-Statics Results And
Cross-Sectional Predictions
Having examined the job-security and free-cash-flow effects in isola-
tion, we now show that putting them together yields a rich set of
empirical predictions regarding the choices of debt, managerial effort,
managerial compensation, managerial turnover, expected return on
investment and value of the firm. The two effects however, may work
in opposite directions, since the free-cash-flow effect always discour-
ages managerial effort, while the job-security effect may induce either
more or less managerial effort, depending on the sign of ′(Ŝ). Conse-
quently, the interaction between the two effects is in general intractable.
To derive cross-sectional empirical predictions when both effects are
present, we therefore impose more structure on the model and run
numerical simulations.
To facilitate the numerical simulations, we assume that the dis-
utility from managerial effort is ψ(e) = ke2 and the distribution of
the cash flow in period 2 is a weighted sum of two exponential dis-
tributions, H1(y) = 1 − e−ym/l and H2(y) = H3(y) = 1 − e−y(m+t)/l,
where k m t and l are positive constants.20 Note that (y) ≡
H2(y) − H1(y) ≥ 0 for all y ≥ 0 and (y) increases with t, so higher
values of t are associated with a higher marginal productivity of effort.
The mean cash flow in period 2 under an alternative manager is
ȳ = l/(m + t), while the mean cash flow under the incumbent man-
ager is a weighted average of ȳ and l/m. Since the mean cash flow
19 Indeed, Denis and Denis (1995) find a large improvement in the performance of
firms that replace their managers.
20 We choose ψ(e) to be quadratic because then the first-order condition for the
manager’s problem is linear in e. The coefficient k is chosen to guarantee that the man-
ager’s problem has an interior solution, i.e., 0 ≤ e∗ ≤ 1 (since e represents effort, it must
be nonnegative; moreover, since H is a weighted average of two distributions, e has
to be less than 1). The distribution functions H1 and H2 were chosen to be exponential
because this allows us to solve the model numerically (we also tried normal, lognormal,
logistic, and gamma distributions but were unable to obtain numerical solutions).
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under both managers increases with l, we interpret l as a measure of
firm size.
Based on the numerical simulations, we report in Section 5.1
comparative-statics results on the effects of changes in the exogenous
variables of the model on the various endogenous variables of inter-
est. The primary reason for reporting these results is to clarify and
illustrate the interaction between the job-security and free-cash-flow
effects. In practice, though, it might be difficult to find good proxies
for the exogenous variables in our model, so the results in Section 5.1
may be hard to test directly. Hence, in Section 5.2 we exploit the fact
that proxies for the endogenous variables in our model are readily
available to derive testable hypotheses based on the predicted corre-
lations between the endogenous variables in our model. We believe
that these hypotheses provide at least a preliminary guide for future
empirical research on the interaction between capital structure and
managerial compensation.
5.1 Comparative-Statics Results
In this subsection we examine how variations in exogenous parame-
ters affect the equilibrium values of debt, managerial effort, manage-
rial compensation, firm value, expected cash flow, and probability of
managerial turnover (henceforth called simply managerial turnover).
Since the job-security effect is mainly driven by B while the free-cash-
flow effect is mainly driven by γ, we fix the values of l m t and k,
and study the impact of changes in B and γ. In Figure 3 we fix the
values of l at 1, of m and t at 0.5, and of k at 10 (setting k = 10 ensures
that the manager’s problem has an interior solution), and describe the
various endogenous variables of interest as a function of γ for three
values of B : 0 10, and 40. In Figure 4 we repeat this exercise for the
case where l = 40. To ensure that the manager’s problem still has
an interior solution we increased k to 30. Changes in m t and k did
not yield new insights, so we do not report comparative-statics results
with respect to these variables. Moreover, running the exercise with
additional values of B (i.e., raising B from 0 to 40 by smaller incre-
ments) and with additional values of l did not make a big difference,
so we do not report these results either.
5.1.1 The Face Value of Debt. We computed F∗ using
equation (A-5) in the Appendix. The results are shown in Figures 3(A)
and 4(A). When B = γ = 0, the manager does not get any bene-
fits of control, so shareholders cannot exploit the job-security effect;
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FIGURE 3. SIMULATION RESULTS UNDER THE ASSUMPTION
THAT l = 1 m = t = 05 k = 10: (A) FACE VALUE OF DEBT; (B)
MANAGERIAL EFFORT; (C) MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION; (D)
MANAGERIAL TURNOVER; (E) EXPECTED CASH FLOW CONDI-
TIONAL ON THE MANAGER’S BEING RETAINED; (F) VALUE OF
THE FIRM
moreover, the manager has no bargaining power, so there is no need
to issue debt to limit his compensation. Hence, F∗ = 0. Moving away
from the origin, F∗ increases monotonically with both B and γ. Intu-
itively, the higher is B, the more effective the job security effect becomes,
so the firm issues more debt to exploit this effect. Similarly, as γ
increases, the free-cash-flow problem becomes more severe, so there is
greater need to restrict the manager’s compensation by issuing debt.
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FIGURE 4. SIMULATION RESULTS UNDER THE ASSUMPTION
THAT l = 40 m = t = 05 k = 30: (A) FACE VALUE OF DEBT; (B)
MANAGERIAL EFFORT; (C) MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION; (D)
MANAGERIAL TURNOVER; (E) EXPECTED CASH FLOW CONDI-
TIONAL ON THE MANAGER’S BEING RETAINED; (F) VALUE OF
THE FIRM
Figure 4(A) shows that when l = 40 (while k is raised to 30 to ensure
that e∗ remains between 0 and 1), the face value of debt is higher than
in the case where l = 1, reflecting the fact that the job-security and
free-cash-flow effects are now stronger.21
21 Raising k to 30 when l = 1 did not change the results but had the disadvantage
that the debt levels as functions of γ for different values of B were all clustered, because
a large k implies a high disutility of effort and hence a low e∗; consequently, debt has
a very small effect on e∗.
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5.1.2 Managerial Effort. We computed e∗ using equation
(8). Figure 3(B) shows that e∗ increases monotonically with B, and
increases monotonically with γ when B is small, but has an inverted
U-shape when B is large. Intuitively, an increase in B makes it more
important for the manager to keep his job, and hence he works harder.
As γ increases, the manager captures a larger fraction of the firm’s free
cash flow. Now, it might be thought that this would imply a higher
e∗, but since the firm issues more debt when γ increases, the firm
has less free cash flow, so the overall effect on e∗ may be negative.
Figure 4(B) shows that when l increases from 1 to 40, the negative
effect of debt on e∗ is ameliorated, so e∗ increases monotonically with
both B and γ.
5.1.3 Managerial Compensation. Our measure of manage-
rial compensation is the expected value of w∗1(y), conditional on the




Ŝ∗ γ(y − Ŝ∗)h(y | e∗)dy
1− H(Ŝ∗ | e∗)
 (12)
In general, Ew∗ is affected by Ŝ∗, which determines the size of the
firm’s free cash flow, and by e∗, which affects the probability that the
cash flow will be large. As Figures 3(c) and 4(c) show, Ew∗ increases
monotonically with both B and γ. Intuitively, an increase in B magni-
fies the job-security effect, and, as we saw earlier, the resulting posi-
tive effect on e∗ outweighs the negative effect due to the increase in Ŝ∗;
hence the overall effect of B on Ew∗ is positive. Although an increase
in γ affects Ŝ∗ more than it affects e∗, the overall effect on Ew∗ is
still positive, due to the increase in the fraction of the free cash flow
that accrues to the manager. The only difference between Figures 3(c)
and 4(c) is that when l = 40 the effect of B on Ew∗ is much weaker
than in the case where l = 1.
5.1.4 Managerial Turnover. The equilibrium probability
that the manager is replaced (i.e., managerial turnover) is given by
H(Ŝ∗ | e∗) and was computed by substituting for Ŝ∗ and e∗ into
equation (1). A priori, it is not clear whether an increase in B and
γ should have a positive or a negative effect on H(Ŝ∗ | e∗), because
the firm issues more debt and hence Ŝ∗ is higher. But since e∗ may
increase as well, the manager may have a better chance to reach Ŝ∗
and save his job. Figure 3(D) shows that when B increases, the positive
effect of e∗ dominates, so there is less managerial turnover. When γ
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increases, the negative effect of the increase in Ŝ∗ dominates, so there
is more managerial turnover. Figure 4(D) shows that when l = 40,
H(Ŝ∗ | e∗) still decreases in B, but now it may also decrease in γ if γ
is small. This is because the increase of l to 40 means that the marginal
productivity of effort, (S), is higher, so e∗ has a stronger effect on
the firm’s cash flow. Hence, when γ is small, the positive effect of the
increase in e∗ dominates the associated negative effect of the increase
in Ŝ∗ so H(Ŝ∗ | e∗) decreases with increasing γ. When γ is large, the
opposite may hold.
5.1.5 Expected Cash Flow Conditional on the Manager’s
Being Retained. The expected cash flow when the manager is




Ŝ∗ yh(y | e∗)dy
1− H(Ŝ∗ | e∗)
 (13)
Figure 3(E) shows that when l = 1, both Ŝ∗ and e∗ increase with B and
γ, thus leading to higher expected cash flow. When l = 40, e∗ may
decrease with increasing γ if γ is large, but as Figure 4(E) shows, the
corresponding increase in Ŝ∗ dominates, so overall, CF1(e∗) increases
with B and γ throughout.
5.1.6 The Value of the Firm. Equation (11) shows that the
value of the firm, V , is positively affected by e∗, negatively affected
by w∗1(y), and, holding e
∗ and w∗1(y) constant, it is negatively affected
by managerial turnover, H(Ŝ∗ | e∗). As we saw earlier, an increase in
γ leads to an increase in w∗1(y), and in general it has an ambiguous
effect on e∗ and on H(Ŝ∗ | e∗). Figure 3(F) shows that when l = 1, the
negative effect of γ through its effect on w∗1(y) and H(Ŝ
∗ | e∗) domi-
nates the positive effect of γ through the increase in e∗, so V decreases
with increasing γ. In contrast, when l = 40, H(Ŝ∗ | e∗) decreases with
increasing γ for low γ while e∗ increases, and as Figure 4(F) shows,
these positive effects outweigh the negative effect due to the increase
in w∗1(y); hence V increases with γ. As γ increases, H(Ŝ
∗ | e∗) begins
to increase γ, so together with the increase in w∗1(y) it outweighs the
positive effect of the increase in e∗, so V begins to decrease in γ.
Figures 3(F) and 4(F) also show that V increases in B, reflecting the
positive effect of B on e∗ and on the probability of turnover.
5.1.7 The Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Managerial
Compensation. Equation (4) indicates that when the incumbent
manager retains his job, he receives a fraction γ of his incremental
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contribution to the net cash flow. Hence, the parameter γ measures
in our model the pay-performance sensitivity of the manager’s wage
contract.22 Using the latter as a proxy for the manager’s bargaining
power, it follows from Figures 3 and 4 that leverage, expected com-
pensation, and expected cash flow are all positively correlated with
managerial pay-performance sensitivity. Interestingly, Figure 3 and 4
indicate that the probability of a managerial turnover and the value
of the firm are not correlated with the pay-performance sensitivity of
the manager’s contract; as we explained earlier, this is because the
job-security and free-cash-flow effects work in opposite directions.
5.2 Correlations Between Endogenous Variables
Although the comparative-statics analysis reported in the previous
subsection is very useful for understanding the various forces that
shape the equilibrium in our model, it has a drawback in that in prac-
tice B and γ are either unobservable or hard to estimate. This makes it
difficult to test our predictions directly. In this section, we exploit the
fact that proxies for the endogenous variables in our model are readily
available to derive testable hypotheses based on the predicted corre-
lations between these variables. To this end, we conduct the following
experiment. We fix the values of k t m and l, and independently
draw at random 100 pairs of B and γ from the square [0 40]× [0 1].
For each pair, we solve the model numerically and obtain 100 equilib-
rium outcomes. Using these outcomes, we are then able to observe the
pairwise correlations between the equilibrium values of the endoge-
nous variables that are driven by variations in B and γ. Figure 5 shows
our findings when l = 1m = t = 05 and k = 10, and Figure 6
shows similar findings for l = 40m = t = 05 and k = 30 (k was
raised to 30 to ensure an interior solution for the manager’s problem).
Figure 5 therefore corresponds to “small firms” (l = 1), while Figure 6
corresponds to “large firms” (l = 40). In each case, we run linear
regressions between the equilibrium values of the endogenous vari-
ables, and show in each box the fitted regression line and the value of
R2. This procedure produces predictions about the cross-section corre-
lations between easy-to-measure endogenous variables that are driven
by variations in the underlying values of B and γ.
Several interesting predications emerge from Figures 5 and 6.
First, controlling for firm size, the face value of debt and manage-
rial compensation are strongly positively correlated. This prediction
is consistent with Gaver and Gaver (1993), who find a positive corre-
lation between debt/equity ratios (both book and market values) and
22 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation of γ.
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FIGURE 5. SIMULATIONS RESULTS FOR A RANDOM SELECTION
OF 100 PAIRS OF B AND GAMMA, ASSUMING THAT l = 1 m =
T = 05 AND k = 10 (THE SOLID LINES IN EACH FRAME
ARE FITTED LINEAR REGRESSIONS): (A) DEBT AND MANAGE-
RIAL COMPENSATION; (B) MANAGERIAL TURNOVER AND FIRM
VALUE; (C) DEBT AND EXPECTED CASH FLOW; (D) MANAGE-
RIAL COMPENSATION AND EXPECTED CASH FLOW; (E) MAN-
AGERIAL TURNOVER AND DEBT; (F) MANAGERIAL TURNOVER
AND EXPECTED COMPENSATION
the average cash compensation of the five most highly paid executives
in each firm, and with Berger et al. (1997), who find a positive corre-
lation between net increases in leverage (net debt issued minus equity
issued plus equity repurchased over total assets) and increases in the
CEO’s holdings of exercisable stock options. It should be emphasized
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FIGURE 6. SIMULATIONS RESULTS FOR A RANDOM SELECTION
OF 100 PAIRS OF B AND GAMMA, ASSUMING THAT l = 40 m =
t = 05 AND k = 30 (THE SOLID LINES IN EACH FRAME
ARE FITTED LINEAR REGRESSIONS): (A) DEBT AND MANAGE-
RIAL COMPENSATION; (B) MANAGERIAL TURNOVER AND FIRM
VALUE; (C) DEBT AND EXPECTED CASH FLOW; (D) MANAGE-
RIAL COMPENSATION AND EXPECTED CASH FLOW; (E) MAN-
AGERIAL TURNOVER AND DEBT; (F) MANAGERIAL TURNOVER
AND EXPECTED COMPENSATION
that the intuition for this result in our model is subtle, since both debt
and compensation are determined endogenously. Hence, cross-firm
variations in debt and compensation are driven by variations in the
underlying values of B and γ. The positive correlation between debt
and compensation is a direct consequence of the analysis in Section 5.1
that shows that F∗ and Ew∗ are both increasing in B and γ.
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Second, Figure 5(B) reveals that in the case of small firms, firm
value and managerial turnover show a strong negative correlation.
This suggests that firms that replace their managers more often have
on average lower values. The strong negative correlation reflects our
findings in Section 5.1 that the probability of turnover increases in
γ and decreases in B, while the value of the firm decreases in γ
and increases in B. Figure 6(B) shows that in the case of large firms,
the negative correlation between the two variables is weaker. This
is because now managerial turnover is a U-shaped function of γ,
while firm value is an inverted U-shaped function of γ. Moreover,
the respective extrema are attained at different values of γ. The nega-
tive correlation is weakest when γ is low, since then the value of the
firm is relatively high while managerial turnover is relatively low.
Third, both the face value of debt and managerial compensation
are positively correlated with the expected cash flow conditional on
the manager being retained. This reflects our findings in Section 5.1
that all three variables increase with B and γ. The positive correlation
is much stronger in the case of large firms (see the respective R2 in
each box), because all three variables are less sensitive to changes in
B when l = 40 than when l = 1. This implies that highly levered firms
generate on average a high cash flow and pay their managers high
wages, especially when the firm is large.
Fourth, the face value of debt and managerial compensation
are weakly positively correlated with managerial turnover. Unlike the
previous results, a priori it is unclear whether the correlation between
debt and managerial turnover should be positive or negative, because
the face value of debt increases with B and γ, whereas managerial
turnover increases in B but decreases in γ. As Figures 5(E) and 6(E)
show, when the two effects are taken together, a weak but positive
correlation between the face value of debt and managerial turnover
emerges. Similarly, the weak correlation between managerial com-
pensation and turnover reflects the conflicting predictions regarding
cross-sectional variations in B and in γ: while managerial compensa-
tion increases in B, managerial turnover decreases in B. Consequently,
when firms differ only with respect to the benefits of control of their
managers, our model predicts a negative correlation between man-
agerial turnover and compensation. This negative correlation becomes
weaker, however, when firms also differ with respect to γ, since man-
agerial compensation and turnover are both increasing in γ when
l = 1, whereas managerial compensation increases with γ but man-
agerial turnover is a U-shaped function of γ when l = 40.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the role of compensation contracts
and capital structure in disciplining and monitoring managers and
shown that studying them jointly yields new insights and empirical
predictions. In particularly, we showed that the simultaneous choice
of compensation and capital structure is driven by two effects. The
first, which we call the job-security effect, arises because risky debt
and golden parachutes induce the firm to adopt an ex post ineffi-
cient replacement rule, which in turn motivates the manager to exert
more effort in attempt to secure his job. When the manager meets the
goal that the firm has chosen, keeping him creates a surplus, and this
enables the manager to demand a fraction of his incremental contri-
bution to the cash flow over and above the contribution of an alterna-
tive manager. Debt can now benefit the shareholders by limiting the
free cash flows that the manager can capture. Thus, the combination
of performance-sensitive compensation and optimally chosen capital
structure implements a better incentive and control system.
Our theory enables us to derive a rich set of empirical predic-
tions regarding the impact of managerial replacement on the prices
of equity and debt and on the expected cash flow of the firm. We
also obtain results on the interaction between capital structure, man-
agerial compensation, managerial turnover, firm value. Some of these
results are consistent with existing evidence, while others are yet to be
tested.
Our theory reveals that there is a systematic, and rather complex,
relationship between managerial compensation and capital structure.
This suggests that in empirical cross-section studies on the determi-
nants of managerial compensation and its effects on firm performance,
capital structure should not be used merely as a control variable.
Likewise, empirical research on financial structure should not view
managerial compensation as a simple control variable. Rather, com-
pensation and capital structure should be studied jointly. Although
the theoretical underpinnings of how firms choose their capital struc-
ture and managerial compensation are still not sufficiently developed,
we believe that our paper provides at least a preliminary guide for
future empirical research on these topics.
Although our theory has focused exclusively on internal incen-
tives, external forces such as competition in the product market or in
the market for corporate control are also very important for disciplin-
ing and monitoring managers. Therefore, in a more general setting,
the choices of capital structure and managerial compensation will
have to take into account external incentives as well. For instance,
debt may lower the likelihood of a takeover (Israel, 1991) and hence
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interfere with external incentives to exert effort. Golden parachutes
on the other hand may have a positive effect on managerial quality,
because they weaken the incentive of a manager to resist a takeover
(Lambert and Larcker, 1985). In addition to these theoretical consider-
ations, there is also empirical evidence that suggests that the interac-
tion between internal and external forces is important. For example,
Denis and Denis (1995) find that in a sample of 88 firms that forced
their top managers to resign over the period 1985–1988, 56% were the
targets of some corporate control activity (e.g., block investment in the
firm’s shares, takeovers, LBOs) in the two-year period following the
resignation. In future research it would be interesting to examine the
interaction between managerial compensation and capital structure in
a setting where both internal and external incentives are present.
Appendix
In this appendix we provide the proofs for Lemma 1 and Proposi-
tions 1–5.
Proof of Lemma 1. (i): Assume by way of negation that Ur > B, and
consider the bargaining that takes place if any party wishes to rene-
gotiate the original wage contract. In what follows it is worth recall-
ing that we assume that the contract renegotiation takes place after
the firm has decided to retain the incumbent manager. Hence, the
period 2 net cash flow under the incumbent manager, y − F , must
be sufficiently large; otherwise the firm will surely replace the incum-
bent manager. When the manager makes an offer, he proposes a wage,
w∗m, that leaves shareholders indifferent between accepting, in which
case they get y − F − w∗m, and rejecting, in which case they get V r .
Hence, w∗m = y − F − V r . Likewise, when the shareholders make an
offer, they propose a wage, w∗s , that leaves the manager indifferent
between accepting and getting B + w∗s , and rejecting and getting an
expected payoff Ur . Hence, w∗s = Ur − B. Since the manager makes
an offer with probability γ and the shareholders make an offer with
probability 1− γ, the manager’s monetary compensation is
w∗1(y) = γ(y − F − V r) + (1− γ)(Ur − B) (A-1)
Given w∗1(y), shareholders retain the incumbent manager if and only
if their resulting expected payoff, y−F−w∗1(y), exceeds their expected
payoff under a new manager, V r . Using (A-1) and recalling that ȳ =∫∞
0 yh3(y)dy is the mean cash flow in period 2 under an alternative
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manager, it follows that the incumbent manager is retained if and
only if
y ≥ Ŝ ≡ V r + Ur + F − B = ȳ −
∫ w0+F
w0




Fh3(y) − B (A-2)
Given Ŝ w0 and w∗1(y), the expected payoff of the manager as




Urh(y | e) dy +
∫ ∞
Ŝ




γ(y − Ŝ)h(y | e) dy − ψ(e) (A-3)
where h(y | e) = h2(y) − e′(y). Differentiating U(e), integrating by
parts, and using the assumption that limy→∞ y(y) = 0, the first-
order condition for the optimal effort level e∗ is
U ′(e∗) = γ
∫ ∞
Ŝ
(y)dy − ψ′(e∗) = 0 (A-4)
From (A-2) it follows that ∂Ŝ/∂w0 = H3(w0+F)−H3(w0) > 0 Hence, if
the firm raises w0, then Ŝ increases, and as (A-4) shows, e∗ decreases.
Hence, shareholders are better off lowering w0 to the point where
Ur ≤ B, as this saves them money and leads to more managerial
effort.
(ii): To derive w∗1(y), recall from part (i) of the proof that in the
renegotiation subgame, the manager accepts any nonnegative wage
offer (he cannot accept negative wage offers, because he has no per-
sonal funds) and proposes a wage w∗m = y − Ŝ, where Ŝ ≡ V r + F .
Since the manager is willing to work even without monetary compen-
sation, the equilibrium strategy of shareholders is to offer him w∗s = 0
and accept any offer not exceeding w∗m. In order to be renegotiation-
proof, the period 1 wage contract must specify the expected monetary
compensation that the manager can get from wage renegotiation, so
w∗1(y) = γw∗m = γ(y − Ŝ). ✷
Proof of Proposition 1. Since (·) < 0, the two comparative-statics
results follow immediately from equations (9) and (10). ✷
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The first square-bracketed expressions on the third line of (A-6) and
the second line of (A-7) are obtained by integration by parts and using
the assumption that limy→∞ y(y) = 0. Since the last two terms on
the right side of (A-6) are negative, it follows that w∗0 > 0 only if
∂V /∂Ŝ < 0, in which case, (A-5) implies that F∗ = 0. When F∗ > 0,
(A-5) implies that ∂V /∂Ŝ = 0, so from (A-6) it follows that w∗0 = 0. ✷
Proof of Proposition 3. (i): Let γ = 0, and suppose that ′(ȳ) ≥ 0.
Evaluating (A-7) at F = w0 = 0 and noting from equation (5) that in












This inequality implies that the firm would like to increase Ŝ above ȳ.
Equation (5) reveals that this can be done either by setting F > 0 or by
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setting w0 < 0. The latter option is impossible, however, because the
manager lacks personal funds. Hence, it must be the case that F∗ > 0,
so by Proposition 2, w∗0 = 0. As Ŝ → ∞, the probability that the
incumbent manager will be replaced approaches 1, so V → ȳ (recall
that w∗0 = 0 implies that Ur = 0). But, equation (11) evaluated at Ŝ = ȳ
(and w0 = 0) indicates that V > ȳ, so the firm is better off issuing no
debt.
(ii): Suppose that ′(ȳ) ≤ 0. Then (A-8) implies that the share-
holders would like to set Ŝ ≤ ȳ so F∗ = 0. Evaluating (A-6) at












− H(ȳ | e∗) (A-9)
The shareholders would like to set w∗0 > 0 provided that the derivative
is positive. A necessary condition for this is B > −(ȳ)/′(ȳ). ✷
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that H1 = H2. Then (y) = 0 and













Noting from equation (5) that at F = 0 the first term on the right side
of (A-10) vanishes, it follows that so long as γ > 0, it must be the
case that Ŝ∗ > ȳ and hence F∗ > 0. Proposition 2 implies in turn that
w∗0 = 0. To examine the effect of γ on F∗, we differentiate equation








Since the numerator is positive by the second-order condition for a
maximum, it follows that Ŝ increases with γ. Equation (6) then implies
in turn that the firm needs to issue a higher F to implement the
higher Ŝ. ✷
Proof of Proposition 5. (i): The value of equity in period 1 when the
manager is replaced is given by
Er = V r  (A-12)
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The value of equity in period 1, conditional on the manager’s being
retained, is given by
E1 = V r + (1− γ)
∫∞
Ŝ (y − Ŝ∗)h(y | e∗)dy
1− H(Ŝ∗)
 (A-13)
Since the second term in the right side of (A-13) is positive, E1 > Er .
Moreover, since the manager is replaced with probability H(Ŝ∗ | e∗)
and is retained with probability 1 − H(Ŝ∗ | e∗), the value of equity
before the replacement is made is E0 = H(Ŝ∗ | e∗)Er +[1−H(Ŝ∗ | e∗)]E1
Therefore Er < E0 < E1, implying that the value of equity decreases
when the manager is replaced, and increases when the manager is
retained.





yh3(y)dy + F[1− H3(F)] = F +
∫ F
0
(y − F)h3(y)dy (A-14)
The value of debt in period 1 if the manager is retained is given by
D1 = F (A-15)
Since the second term on the right side of (A-14) is negative, D1 > Dr .
Similarly to equity, the value of debt before the replacement is made is
given D0 = H(Ŝ∗ | e∗)Dr+[1−H(Ŝ∗ | e∗)]D1. Hence, Dr < D0 < D1. The
results regarding firm value follow immediately, because firm value
equals the sum of debt and equity values.
(ii): When the manager is replaced, the expected cash flow under
an alternative manager is ȳ. When the manager is retained, the expected
cash flow is equal to the expected value of y, conditional on y being
at least as large as Ŝ∗ (otherwise the manager is replaced). But, if the
firm is leveraged, Ŝ∗ > ȳ, so the expected cash flow exceeds ȳ. ✷
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